Cambridge researchers reveal global pricing trends for fake online accounts

Cambridge researchers reveal global pricing trends for fake online accounts
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Professor Deborah Prentice, Vice-Chancellor | University Of Cambridge

For the first time, researchers have revealed detailed pricing and market dynamics for fake online accounts across hundreds of platforms worldwide. The Cambridge Online Trust and Safety Index (COTSI), developed by a team at the University of Cambridge’s Social Decision-Making Lab, now tracks real-time data from the so-called “online manipulation economy.” This includes SIM farms that mass-produce fake accounts used in scams, social bots, and influence campaigns.

The study, published in Science, analyzed twelve months of COTSI data through July 2025. It found that SMS verification for fake accounts is relatively inexpensive in the US ($0.26), UK ($0.10), and Russia ($0.08), but more costly in Japan ($4.93) and Australia ($3.24). Higher prices in Japan and Australia are attributed to expensive SIM cards and stricter photo ID requirements.

Researchers also observed price spikes for fake Telegram and WhatsApp accounts in countries approaching national elections, suggesting increased demand linked to influence operations.

Dr Jon Roozenbeek, co-lead author from the University of Cambridge, said: “We find a thriving underground market through which inauthentic content, artificial popularity, and political influence campaigns are readily and openly for sale.”

He added: “Bots can be used to generate online attention for selling a product, a celebrity, a political candidate, or an idea. This can be done by simulating grassroots support online, or generating controversy to harvest clicks and game the algorithms.”

“All this activity requires fake accounts, and each one starts with a phone number and the SIM hardware to support it. That dependency creates a choke point we can target to gauge the hidden economics of online manipulation.”

Anton Dek, co-lead author from the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, noted: “Misinformation is subject to disagreement across the political spectrum. Whatever the nature of inauthentic online activity, much of it is funnelled through this manipulation market, so we can simply follow the money.”

To create COTSI’s global price index, researchers identified seventeen major vendors supplying fake account verifications using both physical SIMs and virtual numbers provided by Communications Platform as a Service (CPaaS) or Internet-of-Things providers. Prices were tracked not only for social media sites but also dating apps, cryptocurrency exchanges, ride-hailing services like Uber, music streaming platforms such as Spotify or Apple Music (not named specifically), e-commerce sites including Amazon (https://www.amazon.com/), as well as brands like Nike (https://www.nike.com/) and McDonald’s (https://www.mcdonalds.com/).

Dek explained: “One SIM card can be used for hundreds of different platforms. Vendors recoup SIM costs by selling high-demand verifications for apps like Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/) and Telegram (https://telegram.org/), then profit from the long tail of other platforms.”

Meta (https://about.meta.com/), Grindr (https://www.grindr.com/), Shopify (https://www.shopify.com/), X/Twitter (https://twitter.com/), Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/), TikTok (https://www.tiktok.com/), LinkedIn (https://www.linkedin.com/), Amazon—these are among platforms where average global prices per verification remain low.

Researchers tested purchasing verifications themselves; success rates varied depending on whether virtual or physical SIMs were used.

Dek said: “Fingerprinting by some platforms can mean IP addresses get banned if registration fails. High-quality verifications involve a physical SIM requiring huge banks of phones. Nations in which SIM cards are more expensive have higher prices for fake accounts. This is likely to suppress rates of malicious online activity.”

The study also examined SMS verification prices before 61 national elections held between summer 2024 and summer 2025 across eight major social media platforms including Google/YouTube/Gmail (https://about.google/intl/en/products/youtube/, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox); Facebook; Instagram; Twitter/X; WhatsApp; TikTok; LinkedIn; Telegram.

Fake account prices rose sharply on direct messaging apps like Telegram (+12%) and WhatsApp (+15%) during election periods worldwide—a trend not seen on Facebook or Instagram.

Roozenbeek commented: “A fake Facebook account registered in Russia can post about the US elections and most users will be none the wiser. This isn’t true of apps like Telegram and WhatsApp.” He added that state actors such as Russia use Telegram heavily for information warfare.

The research highlights how large-scale vendors often operate out of China or Russia using local payment systems while reselling globally registered accounts—even after recent Russian legislation banning third-party registrations led some vendors to suspend Russian-registered SMS verifications as of September 2025.

Prof Sander van der Linden concluded: “The COTSI shines a light on the shadow economy of online manipulation by turning a hidden market into measurable data.” He added: “Understanding the cost of online manipulation is the first step to dismantling the business model behind misinformation.”

In April 2025, new UK legislation made operating SIM farms illegal—the first such law in Europe—enabling future studies with COTSI to monitor its impact.

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