Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued a joint statement at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on November 19, 2025. The statement addressed ongoing developments in Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program under Agenda Item 5d.
The three countries expressed appreciation for the IAEA Director General’s latest report on Australia’s program and his continued commitment to keeping the Board informed about the agency’s engagement with naval nuclear propulsion programs. They highlighted that technical discussions between Australia and the IAEA are ongoing to develop safeguards and verification measures for Australia’s initiative, including arrangements under Article 14 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
The statement noted: “As outlined in the report, detailed technical discussions are continuing between Australia and the IAEA in order to develop a robust safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program, including an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Topics under discussion include: the structure of the Material Balance Area, the facility and the site for the new facilities related to Australia’s planned naval nuclear propulsion program; as well as technical discussion of safeguards by design.”
It was further confirmed that once these arrangements are finalized, they will be transmitted to the Board of Governors for action. The AUKUS partners stated their full support for this process.
“We reiterate our commitment to ensuring that the safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program sets the highest non-proliferation standard. As we have stated previously, this does not mean imposing a ‘one size fits all’ model for verifying naval nuclear propulsion – given state specific variations between programs, such an approach would not be effective. Rather, it means enabling the IAEA to continue to meet its technical objectives at all stages of the lifecycle of Australia’s future submarines – so that the IAEA will be able to confirm that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of declared nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia,” according to their statement.
The partners also emphasized transparency as they work toward supporting Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines from early 2030s onward. They pointed out that “Australia has continued to fulfil all reporting requirements under its CSA, Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangements. And the IAEA has continued to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia’s NNP program, within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements. These activities have included complementary access and collection of environmental samples at relevant locations.”
They referenced recent operational milestones such as a US Virginia Class submarine arriving at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia on October 29 for scheduled maintenance—a step seen as preparation for a rotational presence by US and UK submarines starting from 2027.
“There will be no nuclear or radiological work conducted by Australians on board the SSN or ashore at HMAS Stirling during the SMP. AUKUS partners informed the Agency of this activity before it occurred,” they said.
All activities related to submarine maintenance were described as compliant with non-proliferation obligations under international treaties including Australia's agreements with both IAEA and regional frameworks like the Treaty of Rarotonga.
The statement reiterated support for independent negotiation between states and IAEA regarding safeguards arrangements: “Interference in negotiation and implementation…would politicise [the] independence [of] mandate and technical authority [of] IAEA… It is important that all Member States continue to support…[its] ability…to carry out its mandate…and undertake its technical work independently…”
AUKUS partners welcomed continued Board discussions about naval nuclear propulsion programs based on independent reporting from IAEA leadership. They concluded by requesting public release of report GOV/INF/2025/12 “in interest of openness and transparency.”